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FAITH AND FOREIGN POLICY IN
INDIA: LEGAL AMBIGUITY,
SELECTIVE XENOPHOBIA, AND
ANTI-MINORITY VIOLENCE
By Chad M. Bauman
A
s a secular democracy, India’s
constitution enshrines relatively robust
safeguards for religious equality and
freedom. Article 25 provides all citizens
the right to “freely profess, practice, and
propagate” religion, and avoids assigning to
Hinduism any special role or explicit privilege (in
contradistinction to the situation with Buddhism
in Sri Lanka, for example). Moreover, the Indian
government itself has not generally engaged in
any systematic or ﬂagrant way in the direct
persecution or oppression of its religious
minorities.
However, India’s religious minorities do face
certain challenges. Among them are several legal
and judicial issues. Judicial rulings in
independent India have weakened the safeguards
of the constitution in several ways, such as when,
in the 1970s, the Supreme Court declared that
the constitutional right of “propagation” did not
include (or protect) the right to intentionally
convert another. Similarly, half a dozen Indian
states have now passed “Freedom of Religion”
laws (called “anti-conversion” laws by their
critics) that have been problematically and
prejudicially implemented, as has a national anti-
defamation law. Additionally, national laws
securing reserved seats in Indian legislatures, civil
service, and educational institutions for lower-
caste Hindus (but not for lower-caste non-
Hindus) provide implicit disincentives to lower-
caste Hindus considering conversion. Finally, a
weak and easily corrupted criminal justice system
exacerbates many of these legal issues, and is
frequently used by anti-minority actors who
exploit the legal ambiguity with regard to
religious freedoms in India to harry religious
minorities with spurious charges or unlawful
imprisonment, thereby undermining the
protections that Indian law does afford religious
minorities.
In addition to these legal issues, religious
minorities in India are occasionally threatened,
intimidated, harassed, sexually assaulted, and
attacked by their neighbors, in both small-scale,
isolated incidents and in the context of large-scale
riots. While the perpetrators of these incidents are
not state actors, generally speaking, they do in
many cases enjoy the explicit or implicit support
of local or even national law enforcement and
political ofﬁcials. For example, local, regional,
state, and even central governments have been
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accused, at various times, of intentionally
responding slowly, or even inhibiting a
police response to instances of anti-minority
violence.
The more secular of India’s two dominant
political parties, the Indian National Congress (or
“Congress”) party, has occasionally been linked to
anti-minority activities, most notably in the anti-
Sikh bloodletting that took place after the party’s
powerful prime minister, Indira Gandhi, was
assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984.
Nevertheless, accusations of involvement in anti-
minority activities are far more regularly leveled,
and justiﬁably so, at the broad association of
nationalist social, religious, and cultural
organizations called the Sangh Parivar (or
“Sangh”), and at the political party associated
with it, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, “Indian
People’s Party”). It is for this reason that the BJP’s
resounding national electoral victory in late 2014
appears to have emboldened anti-minority social
and state actors, and has caused India’s religious
minorities a great deal of concern.
In what follows, I provide the minimum
amount of historical and contextual information
necessary to understand contemporary dynamics
at a basic level. After that, I describe the
contemporary situation in more detail. In the
ﬁnal section, I provide some recommendations to
US foreign policy specialists on how to intervene
(and/or not intervene) productively in support of
religious freedom and religious minorities in
India.
Historical Context
While this article focuses on India’s minority
Muslims and Christians, they are not, by any
means, India’s only religious minorities. They are
not even the only religious minorities to
experience violence or other forms of oppression.
As already shown, India’s Sikhs have at times
been harassed, legally deprived, and attacked in
independent India. Since 1984, however, they
have become somewhat more integrated into the
Hindu mainstream, and powerful enough to
avoid blatant forms of systematic oppression.
Similarly, India’s Parsi (Zoroastrian) minority
constitutes a quietist, small, and shrinking (read:
unthreatening) community that barely registers
in India’s census statistics, and is more or less left
alone.
Prejudice against both Muslims and
Christians has a signiﬁcant historical dimension.
Muslim warriors made forays into what is today
India almost from the beginning of Islamic
history, ﬁrst as raiders, and then, after 1200, as
conquerors. From that point until the
establishment of the British Raj in 1858, a
succession of Muslim dynasties ruled large swaths
of territory in what is today India and Pakistan.
There is great debate among Indians and scholars
of India about whether this period constitutes one
of the truly productive and “sparkling phases”1
(Larson 1995, 109) of Indian and world history
or, rather, one of plunder, religious persecution,
and violence.
Because of these factors, the question of
whether the ﬁrst Mughal Emperor, Babar (1483–
1530), destroyed a Hindu temple to build a
mosque (the Babri Masjid), whether that temple
had been dedicated to the Hindu God, Ram, and
whether the location marks the actual spot of
Ram’s birth spot, are sensitive and symbolically
potent questions that have plagued Hindu-
Muslim relations for at least 160 years (and have
led to some of the worst Hindu-Muslim violence,
in 1992). So also are the more general questions
about to what extent India’s Muslim rulers
engaged in coercive conversions, and what
percentage of India’s contemporary Muslims
could trace their ancestry to Hindus (and should,
therefore, in the minds of some nationalistic
Hindus, be returned to their “ancestral” religion).
What is absolutely certain is that the foreign
origins and imperial history of Islam in India has
made it a suspect and much disparaged religion
among those who consider India a nation of and
for “Hindus.”
In similar ways, despite having a presence
there no later than the 4th century, Christianity in
India is popularly associated with the period of
European colonization that began, slowly, a
millennium later with Vasco da Gama’s arrival in
India in 1498, grew quickly, and in favor of the
British East India Company in the subsequent
centuries, and morphed into the British Raj from
1858 until India’s independence in 1947. While
India’s European rulers are not generally accused
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of physically coercing the colonized to convert to
Christianity, they are justiﬁably blamed for
mixing trade, politics, and religion, and for using
their superior political and economic power to
favor Christianity and Christian moral norms. As
with the Islamic situation, there is a great deal of
contemporary debate about the European, and
particularly the British legacy in India. Moreover,
because of the long centuries of Christian
dominance in India, Christianity has become
associated there with foreign rule and
intervention, with the excesses of empire, with
western wealth and power, and with the
exploitation of that power for religious gain.
Because of that association, concerns about
the processes of colonization and Christianization
often mixed and fed one another, with destructive
result. In the Indian Rebellion of 1857–1858, for
example, Indian and European Christians
otherwise unassociated with colonial rule were
attacked along with colonial ofﬁcials, suggesting
that Indians generally did not distinguish
between British civilizing and Christianizing
missions (Wagner 2010, 39). Fifty years later,
after a succession of signiﬁcant mass conversions
to Christianity, the concern was still palpable, as
in U. N. Mukherjee’s series of 1909 articles in
The Bengalee titled “Hindus—A Dying Race,” in
which he used demographic data to argue that
Hinduism would disappear in 420 years
(Mukherji 1909; Jaffrelot 1996, 24). Not
surprisingly, then, as the independence
movement built steam in the ﬁrst decades of the
20th century it became, in some strains,
chauvinistically Hindu and xenophobic (though
only selectively so, as implied by this article’s title,
because other aspects of foreign culture and
technology have been, and remain,
enthusiastically embraced).
Nowhere is that xenophobia more clearly
demonstrated than in the writings of
V. D. Savarkar’s 1923 tract, Hindutva: Who is a
Hindu? which posited that the essential and
unifying identity of Indians was and should be
their Hindu-ness, or Hindutva. A true Indian, for
Savarkar, was one who could call India both
fatherland and holy land (which Muslims and
Christians of course could not). Borrowing a page
from Germany’s waxing nationalism, Savarkar
wrote, “If we Hindus grow strong in time
Moslem friends… will have to play the part of
German Jews” (Brasted and Khan 2007, 448).
The origins of the Sangh Parivar lie here. In
1925, inspired by Savarkar’s Hindutva, Keshav
Baliram Hedgewar founded the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; “National Volunteer
Organization”). Hedgewar and M. S. Golwalkar,
who led the RSS from 1940 to his death in 1973,
perpetuated Savarkar’s ideology, and grew the
RSS into a strong organization of activists eager to
implement it. In Golwalkar’s Bunch of Thoughts,
ﬁrst published in 1966, Muslims and Christians
are identiﬁed along with communists as “internal
threats” Golwalkar ([1966] 2000, 177) to the
nation. Golwalkar accuses them of not
participating in the independence struggle, and of
adhering to Semitic religions that are weak and
unattractive but inherently intolerant and
expansionistic (a common theme of critics of
Christianity and Islam in India) (Varadarajan
2002, 17; Kuruvachira 2006, 142, 151).
Despite being banned several times, the RSS
continued to grow in strength throughout the
20th and early 21st centuries, spawning dozens of
regional and national social, cultural, religious,
and political organizations that together comprise
the Sangh Parivar (or “family of the Sangh,” i.e.,
the RSS). The most prominent of these
organizations are the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP; “World Hindu Council”) and the
aforementioned political party, the BJP, which,
while independent in some respects, remains very
much in thrall to the RSS, and to its ideological
underpinnings. For example, in the wake of the
anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat, in 2002, the BJP
Union Home Minister, L. K. Advani renamed an
airport after Savarkar, and current BJP Prime
Minister, Narendra Modi, a former member of
the RSS, has called Golwalkar “Pujniya Shri
Guruji” (a “Guru worthy of worship”) (Modi
2014).
The partition of British India, at
independence, into Muslim-dominated Pakistan
(East and West) and Hindu-dominated India, for
which many of British India’s Muslims had
lobbied, along with the horriﬁc interreligious
violence that resulted from it, remains for the
Sangh proof both of the incompatibility of
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Muslims and Hindus and of the Muslim desire to
weaken and destroy India. If Christians are not
negatively associated with this particular history,
the case of Pakistan serves as a warning for what
could happen if Christianity grew too strong in
India. The 1956 Report of the Madhya Pradesh
state-sponsored Christian Missionary Activities
Inquiry Committee, which continues to be
inﬂuential, worried that Christians were
expanding their numbers and inﬂuence in central
India as part of a western-led, neo-colonial plot to
dismember and destroy the nation, and establish
an independent Christian state (Goel 1998). The
fact that contemporary separatist movements in
India’s northeastern states are strong in areas
dominated by Christianity, and in some cases
have Christian leadership, lends credibility to the
concern.
In the end, Christians and Muslims are
understood and portrayed by those who espouse
the Hindutva ideology as adherents of foreign
religions incompatible with Hindu dharma
(religion and culture), religions that are
inherently intolerant and craftily expansionist,
with foreign loyalties, and bent on destroying
and/or claiming Hindu India for their respective
religions by introducing foreign mores and
norms, and gathering political power through
numerical growth. In the case of Christians, that
growth is believed—counterfactually, in my view
(Bauman 2015, Chapter 4)—to come about
primarily as a result of conversions induced
through various forms of material allurement
made possible through signiﬁcant foreign
Christian support for evangelism in India. In the
case of Islam, the claim—also largely
counterfactual, but politically expedient—is that
Muslims inevitably reject modern forms of birth
control, engage in polygamous unions more than
Hindus, and have far higher than average fertility
rates.
The growth of Islam and Christianity in India
does of course represent a threat to the Sangh’s
homogenizing ideology and agenda by
representing heterogeneity, by advocating for
more secular and inclusive visions of the nation,
and by converting from and making alliances
with lower-caste Hindu communities,
undermining, and decreasing the size of the
broader Hindu unity the Sangh hopes to forge.
The harassment and oppression of Islam and
Christianity in India, therefore, can be seen as a
response to this perceived political threat, and an
attempt to unify all Hindus, of all castes, under a
Hindu banner. It can also be seen as a nativist
reaction to the political and cultural challenge of
globalization, westernization, and other forms of
foreign intervention (e.g., terrorism, foreign
support for Christian evangelism, and the
building of mosques) of which India’s Christians
and Muslims are perceived to be the primary
purveyors and beneﬁciaries, and for which,
therefore, they come to be a kind of local proxy
(Bauman and Leech 2011; Bauman 2013).
Contemporary Dynamics
India’s Christians and Muslims continue to
suffer under certain legal and social forms of
discrimination. Evangelistic Christians ﬁnd
particularly problematic the Supreme Court’s
exclusion of intentional conversion from the
deﬁnition of “propaganda” in their interpretation
of the constitution (as discussed in the
Introduction) and, for similar reasons, the
Freedom of Religion laws that are active in half a
dozen states, and which are periodically (but so
far unsuccessfully) proposed at the national level.
These laws forbid conversions by force, fraud,
and allurement, and in some cases also require
that prospective converts and those converting
them register their intent with law and order
enforcement authorities ahead of time. The
prohibition against conversions by force, fraud,
and allurement would not generally be
objectionable to religious rights activists, except
for the fact that the terms are so vague that
infractions can be claimed in almost any case of
conversion. Christian offers of charity, or
promises of eternal life, or of greater respect and
more digniﬁed treatment for members of the
lower castes, for example, can be construed as
forms of allurement. That these laws are used
primarily to harass Indian Christians, and serve
no other useful purpose, is evident in the fact that
Hindus are almost never charged under them,
even in cases where it becomes clear that converts
have been explicitly offered ﬁnancial
remuneration.
faith and foreign policy in india
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Making matters worse is that easily corrupted
law enforcement ofﬁcers often act in collusion
with local anti-Christian activists to spuriously
book Christian evangelists under these laws. A
common feature of violent attacks on Christians
is that the victims are afterwards dragged to a
police station and booked under a Freedom of
Religion law. At other times, the victims are
charged under Section 295a of the Indian Penal
Code which threatens imprisonment for those
“outraging the religious feelings of any class of
citizens of India, by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs or by visible representations
or otherwise” (which many forms of evangelism
can be construed to do). Section 295a is that rare
and curious kind of law that
problematically encourages
citizens to be outraged in
order to be certain the law is
invoked.
India’s reservation system
represents another form of
legal discrimination that
effects Muslims and
Christians equally. The reservation system
reserves seats in local and national legislatures,
educational institutions, and civil service posts for
members of India’s low-caste and tribal
communities. However, the low-caste
reservations are available only to “Hindus” (a
category that has been legally clariﬁed to include
Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs). A low-caste Hindu
who converts to Islam or Christianity, then,
forfeits his or her right to the much-desired
reservations, which observers have rightly pointed
out constitutes a disincentive to conversion, and
in very practical terms often results in converts
obscuring their new religious afﬁliation, or
refusing to register it ofﬁcially.
If the reservation system discriminates against
India’s Christians and Muslims directly, India’s
system of religion-speciﬁc “personal laws” do so
indirectly, by providing fodder for those who
claim that the secular state appeases religious
minorities, kowtowing even to their most
regressive tendencies. The laws governing issues
like marriage, divorce, and adoption are not
uniform in India, but are rather speciﬁc to each
religion. This irregularity periodically becomes a
controversial political issue, particularly in the
case of Muslims, whose personal law lacks certain
protections for married women and divorcees that
are enshrined in the Hindu personal law code.
These religion-speciﬁc personal laws were
originally envisaged by India’s founders as
temporary measure, but they have become
entrenched.
In addition to these legal challenges and
forms of discrimination, India’s Christians and
Muslims have their religious rights curtailed
through intimidation and actual physical attack.
While Sangh leaders, and particularly BJP
politicians, generally do not involve themselves
directly in anti-minority violence, they are
frequently suspected and
accused of facilitating or
inciting the violence. And
rank-and-ﬁle members of
Sangh organizations are
prominent and prevalent
among the mobs that engage
in it.
The violence experienced
by Muslims is considerably worse, and more
deadly than that experienced by Christians. In the
decades since independence, thousands of
Muslims have died in incidents of mob violence.
More than 7000 died in the 1980s alone.
Smaller-scale riots in which at least a fewMuslims
are killed are an annual affair, while every recent
decade has witnessed at least one larger-scale
incident.
The most politically signiﬁcant rioting in the
1990s occurred in 1992, after a Sangh-led mob in
Ayodhya pre-empted legal and political
considerations of the aforementioned Babri
Masjid’s contested status, and tore it down.
Around 1000 people, mostly Muslim, were
killed, many of them in police ﬁrings, in the riots
that subsequently spread across all of north India.
The most dramatic riots of the next decade took
place in the state of Gujarat, in 2002, after a train
car carrying Sangh activists returning from a
protest in Ayodhya was set ablaze (either by
accident or a deliberate act of arson), killing 58
passengers. Between 600 and 2000 Muslims were
killed in retaliatory riots by Hindus convinced
that Muslims were responsible for the ﬁre.2
EASILY CORRUPTED LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
OFTEN ACT IN COLLUSION
WITH LOCAL ANTI-CHRISTIAN
ACTIVISTS
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Current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
was the state’s Chief Minister at the time,
and accusations that he discouraged or even
actively obstructed an appropriate police response
led to his being denied a visa to visit the United
States until he was elected Prime Minister in
2014.
Christians have also occasionally endured
large-scale, deadly riot violence in independent
India. The largest, and best known anti-Christian
rioting occurred over several months in 2007 and
2008, in and around the Kandhamal region of the
state of Odisha. In these riots, at least several
dozen Christians and a few Hindus died (along
with a beloved if controversial Hindu swami and
anti-Christian campaigner, Lakshmanananda
Saraswati), while around 3000 Christians were
displaced, many of them permanently.3 While
the violence in Kandhamal received a good deal of
media attention, both in India and
internationally, in some ways more concerning
for India’s Christians is the regularity with which
they experience physical attack, theft, arson,
vandalism, and sometimes (but rarely) even
murder at the hands of smaller-scale mobs
sympathetic to the Sangh’s ideology (or using it as
cover for other motivations). These more local,
isolated incidents, which have in recent years
taken place about 250–350 times a year,
disproportionately target more evangelistic
Christian individuals and communities (Bauman
and Leech 2011; Bauman 2015).
Recommendations
International criticism of the discrimination
and violence faced by India’s religious minorities
is, it seems obvious enough, perfectly appropriate,
and there are many secularist individuals and
organizations at work in India that would
generally welcome thoughtful international
interventions and support. As is perhaps obvious
from the foregoing discussion, those concerned
about religious freedom in India would do well to
advocate for reforms and improvements in three
broad areas: (1) the law in and of itself, (2) the
preservation and application of law and order, and
(3) the judicial system.
First, the legal reforms. Religious freedom in
India would be well-served by clearer
constitutional protections for proselytization.
The Supreme Court’s argument that the right to
“propagate” one’s faith does not include the right
to intentionally convert another leaves those who
might consider it their religious obligation to
convert others in legal limbo. If there are concerns
about the illicit use of money or other forms of
allurement in the context of conversion, then
perhaps laws like the Freedom of Religious laws
now on the books in several states would be
appropriate, provided those laws possess a clarity
they do not currently possess regarding the
deﬁnitions of “allurement,” and an explicit
exemption of what might be called “spiritual
allurements” (e.g., promises of dignity or reward
in the next life). Similarly, Section 295a of the
Indian penal code, which threatens punishment
to those who outrage the religious feelings of
others, ought to be stricken from the penal code
altogether, or at the very least clariﬁed to exempt
mere criticism of others’ religious beliefs,
however, harsh it may be.
Additionally, both religious freedom and
interreligious harmony would be well-served, in
my view, either by abandoning the system of
reservations, which, as described above,
constitute a de facto allurement to Hinduism for
members of India’s lower castes, by making the
basis of reservations one’s economic situation
rather than one’s caste, or at the very least by
extending the reservations to lower-caste
adherents of all religions (as is the case with tribal
reservations). Scrapping the reservations
altogether would be unpopular among the many
lower-caste and tribal communities that beneﬁt
from them. Nevertheless, the system of
reservations, like the religion-speciﬁc system of
personal law, constitutes a perpetual source of
interreligious disharmony and conﬂict (and was,
in fact, one of the precipitating causes of the anti-
Christian riots in Kandhamal).
Second, India should be encouraged, and
given ﬁnancial support, to improve its systems of
law and order. India’s police ofﬁcers are
notoriously underpaid and under-armed, which
contributes both to their corruptibility and to the
likelihood that they will simply leave their posts
in the face of riot violence. India’s Muslims and
Christians often complain that police ofﬁcers
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stand idly by—or, worse yet, join in—when they
are attacked, or when their possessions are stolen
or destroyed. Moreover, because of their
corruptibility, and because they are not held
accountable for abuses of authority and the law,
India’s police ofﬁcers frequently obstruct
minority attempts to ﬁle reports against their
persecutors, or even collude with the perpetrators
to unlawfully detain or ﬁle spurious reports
against the victims. No equal freedoms, religious
or otherwise, can exist in such a situation. And no
reform of the laws, as recommended above, will
be effective while the police continue to
knowingly and with impunity misuse the law to
target minorities.
Finally, judicial improvements are necessary
to ensure that those who violently attack religious
minorities on any pretense, including in putative
retaliation for perceived wrongs, are brought to
justice. It is tragically predictable that in the
context of any large-scale act of violence against
India’s religious minorities, Sangh leaders and
associates will claim that the violence was merely a
“natural” response to some perceived provocation
(e.g., conversion by material allurement, criticism
ofHinduism, and the elopement of aMuslimman
with a Hindu woman). Very often the
provocations named are pure ﬁction, and in many
other cases the actions that purportedly justify a
violent response are not in any way illegal (e.g.,
eating beef in states where doing so is illegal, the
consensual elopement of single adults). But even
in cases where religious minorities have broken
laws and thereby offended their Hindu neighbors,
those who care about religious freedom in India
must insist on a legal (rather than extra-legal)
reaction. Those who would take the law into their
own hands must be held accountable and what is
perceived by India’s minorities to be a widespread
culture of impunity for offenders must be
addressed. One of the particularly troubling
characteristics of violence against India’s Muslims
and Christians is how infrequently the
perpetrators are even charged, let alone convicted,
and how regularly witnesses become corrupted, or
are intimidated into changing their stories in order
to exculpate criminals.
That these reforms are necessary is perhaps
clear enough. But foreigners wishing to effectively
advocate for broader religious freedom in India
would do well to carefully consider the manner in
which such concerns are raised with the Indian
government. To that end, then, I make three
recommendations about the style, rather than the
substance, of foreign intervention on behalf of
religious freedom in India.
First, a healthy dose of humility will go a long
way. As described above, there are certainly forms
of Hinduism that incline in a nationalistic and
xenophobic direction, and for this reason
Hinduism cannot be said to be a universally
tolerant religion. Nevertheless, India’s religious
traditions do have a long and ancient history of
producing and practicing tolerance for religious
minorities, one that predates the origins of the
idea of tolerance in the West. Likewise, the norm,
in terms of majority–minority relations in India,
is one of harmony, mutual friendship, and even
hybridity (Gottschalk 2000).
Moreover, Indians are far more aware of
current events in the United States than vice versa.
They are aware, for example, of recent
controversies in the United States about alleged
police brutality and racism, and of hate crimes
directed at Muslims and non-Muslims mistaken
for Muslims (many of them Sikhs of South Asian
origin). In fact, in proportion to the size of their
respective populations, the frequency of what in
the United States would be called “hate crimes”
against India’s Christians is roughly the same as
the frequency of anti-Muslim hate crimes in the
United States. US advocacy for reform in India
will sound hollow and hypocritical to Indians,
therefore, if the US’s own issues with
interreligious harmony are not adequately
acknowledged and addressed.
Second, those wishing to improve the lot of
India’s religious minorities must be certain to
express equal concern for all religious minorities.
There is a perception in India that American
politicians and media are concerned primarily
with protecting India’s Christian minorities. To
the extent that this perception endures, US
advocacy for “religious freedom” will be perceived
not as a disinterested form of advocacy for the
rights of all, but rather as an underhanded form of
Christian boosterism. Moreover, neglecting to
advocate on behalf of India’s Muslims, who suffer
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far more than India’s Christians, perpetuates the
belief among Indians that Americans, as a Hindu
hotel proprietor once put it to me, “hate
Muslims, too,” and thereby makes India’s
Muslim minorities even more vulnerable to
attack.
In this regard, it is also important that the
United States and others concerned about
religious freedom in India apply their standards
evenly. Nothing sounds more inconsistent (and
prejudicially Christocentric) to those resistant to
US intervention on Indian matters of religious
freedom than when, for example, Americans
criticize Sangh-sponsored attempts to “reconvert”
Muslims and Christians to Hinduism while
advocating for full freedom with regard to
Christian proselytizing efforts. For example,
when United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
implicitly criticizes the Sangh, as it did in its
Annual Report 2015, for raising money to
“reconvert” Christians to Hinduism, and for
noting that “it cost nearly 200,000 rupees (US
$3200) per Christian and 500,000 rupees (US
$8000) per Muslim” (United States Commission
on International Religious Freedom 2015, 151)
to do so, the Sangh could justiﬁably cry foul,
since the Sangh was (probably intentionally)
employing a proselytizing and fund-raising
strategy that mimics that of well-publicized
Christian evangelistic campaigns. What’s good
for the goose is good for the gander, and the focus
ought to be on preserving the freedom to
proselytize and convert to and from all religions,
and ensuring that any legal prohibitions against
conversion (e.g., by physical force or by explicit
offers of ﬁnancial gain) are applied evenly across
all religions.
Relatedly, US ofﬁcials should avoid
contributing to the unhelpful elision of the terms
“allurement” and “force/forcible” in Indian law
and public discourse, as USCIRF did in the
instance discussed just above, where it described
these Sangh-led attempts to lure Christians and
Muslims to Hinduism with ﬁnancial incentives as
attempts to “forcibly” reconvert them. While the
issue of conversion by physical force or coercion is
a relatively simple matter, and nearly universally
condemned, the issue of allurement through
ﬁnancial or other incentives is more complex and
contested. Rhetorically conﬂating the use of
physical force with the more complex issue of
allurement only serves the purposes of those who
oppose proselytization of any kind. But for those
wishing to preserve the right to proselytize, and
for those concerned about the deleterious effects
of the ambiguously deﬁned terms utilized in the
“Freedom of Religious” laws (i.e., “force, fraud,
and allurement”), it is important to resist
terminological confusion so that physically
forcing someone to convert and enticing them to
do so through promises of a better or eternal life
do not come to be seen as equally problematic
forms of “forcible” conversion. They are not.
Third, it is important to recognize that, at
least to some extent, the harassment and
suppression of Muslims and Christians in India is
a manifestation of anxiety about foreign intrusion
in Indian affairs (in the form of western-
dominated globalization, the millions of dollars
that arrive each year from western donors in
support of Christian evangelistic efforts, the
substantial spending of Saudi Wahhabis on
mosques and madrasas in India, etc.). Because of
this, it is almost impossible for Americans to
intervene on behalf of religious freedom in India
without exacerbating concerns about foreign
meddling in India affairs. Only extremely careful
diplomacy, therefore, will have a positive effect
that outweighs the reactionary response it is likely
to provoke.
Conclusion
There is much potential for US diplomats,
policy workers, and law makers to collaborate
with their Indian counterparts for the
preservation and expansion of religious freedom
in India, and on behalf of India’s marginalized,
legally disprivileged, and sometimes even
physically attacked religious minorities. India and
the United States share a common commitment
to the ideals of secular democracy, even though
those ideals may manifest themselves differently
in the two countries. Because of this, non-Indians
are justiﬁed in calling India to be accountable to
secular democratic ideals by ensuring the broadest
possible forms of religious freedom, the equitable
application to all religious communities of laws
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governing religion, equal protection for members
of all religious communities by and from abuse at
the hands of police and other security ofﬁcers,
and equal access to a functioning and effective
justice system.
Nevertheless, there are some barriers to
effective American intervention on these issues,
among which the most signiﬁcant is the fact that
the United States is popularly and
problematically associated, in the minds of many
Indians, with (1) Western colonialism and its
contemporary counterpart, globalization, (2)
military collaboration with Pakistan, India’s
bitter and longstanding rival, and (3) highly
visible Christian evangelistic efforts funded in
great part by US donations. For this reason, the
timing, style, and tone of US advocacy must be
particularly carefully considered if it is to have a
positive effect. v
Notes
1. Larson’s chapter 3 provides a useful and concise (if now perhaps slightly outdated) overview of this period of India’s history.
2. It is worth noting that many Hindus are killed, also, in the context of these large-scale riots. However, the number of Muslim dead
generally outpaces that of the Hindus by three or more times.
3. On the Kandhamal riots (though it is now slightly outdated), see Bauman (2010).
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